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Nervous shock: Tame v New South Wales
and Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd
Joachim Dietrich*
A number of legal issues have remained open since the High Court last
considered the question of liability in negligence for nervous shock in 1984.
In Tame and Annetts, two recent decisions of the court, a number of the
outstanding questions were addressed. Specifically, the court considered
the issues of whether the ‘reasonable foresight’ test included a requirement
of ‘normal fortitude’, and whether a claimant needs to establish a ‘sudden
shock’ and a ‘direct perception’ of the accident or its aftermath.
Introduction
Prior to 2002, the case of Jaensch v Coffey1 in 1984 had been the last High
Court decision to consider the question of liability in negligence for ‘nervous
shock’ (as psychiatric injury incurred independently of any physical harm is
‘anachronistically’ described by the law).2 The absence of decisions at the
highest appellate level is not the product of a well-settled, clear and easily
applied set of legal principles. Indeed, lower courts have struggled with many
of the legal issues left unclear by Jaensch v Coffey.
Courts have tended to take a restrictive approach to liability for ‘nervous
shock’ in Australia, as throughout the common law world3 and, indeed,
perhaps civil law jurisdictions as well.4 In Australian law, liability for nervous
shock has been limited by the use of a number of ‘control mechanisms’ setting
out legal requirements beyond mere foreseeability of harm: since ‘foresight of
harm does not suffice to establish the existence of a duty of care’.5 One
well-settled requirement of the law is that plaintiffs must establish that they
have suffered a recognisable psychiatric illness, as opposed to mere grief,
sorrow, fright or distress.6 This limit on the type of harm sounding in damages
has been unanimously accepted as a continuing prerequisite to liability in
Australia, though the difficulties in drawing the boundaries between ‘grief’
and psychiatric illness have been acknowledged by some judges.7
* Faculty of Law, Australian National University.
1 (1984) 155 CLR 549; 54 ALR 417.
2 M Davies, Butterworths Tutorial Series: Torts, 3rd ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 1999, p 190.
3 See, generally, the survey of the common law in N J Mullany and P R Handford, Tort
Liability for Psychiatric Damage: The Law of ‘Nervous Shock’, Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney,
1993.
4 See Hayne J in Tame v New South Wales and Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002)
191 ALR 449 (Tame and Annetts) at [251]–[252].
5 Ibid, at [250] per Hayne J.
6 See, eg, Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383 at 394 per Windeyer J; [1971]
ALR 253; and Gleeson CJ, Tame and Annetts, at [7]: ‘save in exceptional circumstances, a
person is not liable, in negligence, for being a cause of distress, alarm, fear, anxiety,
annoyance, or despondency, without any resulting recognised psychiatric illness’. See also
Tame and Annetts at [193] per Gummow and Kirby JJ.
7 See, eg, Hayne J, Tame and Annetts at [285]–[296].
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It is in relation to the existence, application and scope of other limiting
devices that there has been continuing uncertainty in Australian law. One
general difficulty has been conceptual: there are differing views about where
in the conceptual framework of negligence law these control mechanisms fit.
Are they merely aspects of the reasonable foreseeability test;8 do they operate
as determinants of a second stage of inquiry such as the existence of a
relationship of ‘proximity’;9 or are they separate and distinct policy
limitations on the existence of liability?10 Further, and in relation to the
specific control mechanisms themselves, uncertainties exist as to three critical
issues;11 these issues were considered by the High Court in Tame v New South
Wales and Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd12 (Tame and Annetts), heard
and decided together in 2002:
(1) Is it a requirement that the reasonable foreseeability of nervous shock
is limited to the foreseeability of such a reaction to the (negligently)
caused accident by someone of ‘normal’ or ‘ordinary’ mental
fortitude? In other words, is recovery limited to cases in which only
a plaintiff of normal fortitude would suffer psychiatric damage from
the negligent conduct? Windeyer J in Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey13
appeared to question the need for such ‘normal fortitude’, but the
requirement has been applied by English courts (in relation to
plaintiffs not themselves primary victims of the negligent conduct)14
and was accepted by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Tame’s
case.15
8 This accords with Brennan J’s approach in Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 54 ALR
417. See also the general treatment of nervous shock in R P Balkin and J L R Davis, Law
of Torts, 2nd ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 1996, pp 242–50, which discusses the different
control mechanisms as aspects of reasonable foreseeability, although at p 250 the authors
note ‘that this criterion alone, without other accompanying “proximity factors”, will not
generally serve to impose liability’.
9 Eg, Deane J in Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; 54 ALR 417.
10 See the discussion in F Trindade and P Cane, The Law of Torts in Australia, 3rd ed, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1999, p 367.
11 A fourth factor that may limit liability is the requirement of a sufficient closeness of
relationship between the sufferer of nervous shock and the victim of the accident. This was
not an issue in either Tame or Annetts, though it is raised by a case on appeal to the High
Court from NSW: Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2001) 51 NSWLR 606. The
issue has proved to be problematic in England (where see, eg, Alcock v Chief Constable of
South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310; [1991] 4 All ER 907). Restrictive provisions have
been passed in NSW limiting claims to those who are either victims of an accident or close
‘relatives’ of the victims in the context of industrial accidents (Workers Compensation Act
1987 s 151P), or who are victims of, close relatives of the victims of, or bystanders present
at the scene of, motor vehicle accidents (Motor Accident Compensation Act 1999 s 141)
(and see also Wrongs Act 1936 (SA) s 35A(1)(c) in relation to motor accidents). Similar
restrictions have been included for general application under the Civil Liability Amendment
(Personal Responsibility) Act 2002 (NSW) (assented to 28 November 2002). In Gifford v
Strang, the NSW Court of Appeal interpreted s 151P of the first Act, not as founding liability
in the circumstances it refers to, but as providing that damages cannot be awarded unless
those circumstances exist.
12 (2002) 191 ALR 449.
13 (1970) 125 CLR 383; [1971] ALR 253.
14 See Page v Smith [1996] AC 155; [1995] 2 All ER 736.
15 Tame v Morgan (2000) 49 NSWLR 21.
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(2) Must the foreseeable psychiatric injury have been caused by a
‘sudden’ shock or sensory perception? Brennan J’s judgment in
Jaensch v Coffey16 appeared to suggest such a requirement. Although
no other members of the court in that case expressly adopted this,
some lower courts have treated such a requirement as authoritative.17
In other cases, the need for a ‘sudden’ shock has been criticised.18
(3) Is it necessary that the plaintiff directly perceived a distressing event
or its ‘immediate aftermath’?
Unfortunately, although evidencing a more expansive approach to recovery
for nervous shock, the High Court in Tame and Annetts has failed to provide
an authoritative guide as to the legal position in Australia. All seven judges,
in the course of six separate judgments,19 disallowed the claim and appeal of
Mrs Tame, and allowed the appeal of Mr and Mrs Annetts that the facts as
alleged were sufficient at law to give rise to a duty of care. None the less, their
reasons differed considerably and it is difficult to find a majority opinion in
favour of any clear proposition. This diversity of opinions makes it difficult to
draw confident conclusions as to the appropriate analysis to be adopted. In
particular, there were considerable divisions in the court about all three of the
questions raised by the cases as to the ongoing relevance of the control
mechanisms. Before considering the judgments and how these controversies
were addressed by the court, the facts of the two cases will be briefly
outlined.20 Annetts’ case, in particular, raises most clearly the inherent
difficulties in drawing the boundaries of any liability for nervous shock.
Facts
In Annetts, the appellants were the parents of 16-year-old James who had gone
to work for the respondent on a remote outback cattle station near Halls Creek
in Western Australia. Prior to James commencing employment, his mother had
sought, and obtained, assurances from the station manager that he would be
well looked after and under constant supervision. Despite such assurances,
James was sent as caretaker to a remote out-station about 100 km from the
main station. Several weeks later, James went missing. Upon being told this
over the telephone, James’ father collapsed. James’ parents made several trips
to Halls Creek, and extensive searches were carried out, during which time
some of James’ belongings were found. It was not until nearly five months
later that James’ body was found in the desert, his vehicle having broken
down. James had died from dehydration, exhaustion and hypothermia. His
parents suffered psychiatric illness on hearing that James had gone missing
and later of his death. The Western Australian Full Court had dismissed the
Annetts’ claim, in short because persons of ‘normal fortitude’ in the position
of the parents would not foreseeably have suffered psychiatric injury, and the
16 (1985) 155 CLR 549; 54 ALR 417.
17 See Tame and Annetts (2002) 191 ALR 449 at [206] per Gummow and Kirby JJ, citing Reeve
v Brisbane City Council [1995] 2 Qd R 661 and Pham v Lawson (1997) 68 SASR 124.
18 Eg, Campbelltown City Council v Mackay (1989) 15 NSWLR 501 at 503 per Kirby P.
19 Gummow and Kirby JJ delivered a joint judgment.
20 The decisions of the courts below were considered in this Journal in D Butler, ‘Voyages in
uncertain seas with dated maps: recent developments in liability for psychiatric injury in
Australia’ (2001) 9 TLJ 14.
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Annetts had not suffered a sudden sensory perception, nor directly perceived
the consequences of the defendant’s negligence. The High Court considered
all three of these legal ‘criteria’ and their relevant status in the law of nervous
shock.
In Tame, the facts raised a much weaker claim for damages,21 given the
historically restrictive approach of courts to nervous shock claims generally.
Mrs Tame had been involved in a car accident, which was clearly the fault of
the other driver. After the accident, both parties were blood tested and the
other driver had a blood-alcohol reading of 0.14. As a result of a clerical error
by a police officer, the report form on the accident stated both Mrs Tame’s and
the other driver’s blood-alcohol reading as 0.14. A few weeks later, the error
was noticed and corrected. No one acted on the erroneous report, though
Mrs Tame’s insurers did receive a copy of it. About a year after these events,
Mrs Tame found out about the error. Mrs Tame became obsessed about the
error and, ultimately, suffered psychotic depression. Although the plaintiff had
succeeded in her claim in the District Court, the NSW Court of Appeal had
unanimously allowed the appeal by the defendant. It is perhaps surprising that
leave to appeal was granted to the High Court at all.
‘Normal fortitude’
Of the seven judges, McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ considered that the test
of reasonable foreseeability incorporates within it the foreseeability of
psychiatric injury to a person of normal, ordinary or reasonable mental
fortitude.22 Hayne J, for example, stated the test in the following terms: ‘the
duty which the defendant owes should be held to be a duty to act with
reasonable care not to cause psychiatric injury to a person of reasonable or
ordinary fortitude.’23
Indeed, in a significant retreat from established precedent, McHugh J
criticised the ‘undemanding’ test of reasonable foreseeability adopted in
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt,24 that a risk is foreseeable so long as it is not
‘far-fetched or fanciful’.25 In McHugh J’s view:
When it is necessary to determine foreseeability in the duty context, the
development of the law of negligence as a socially useful instrument now requires
the rejection of the attenuated test of foreseeability . . . adopted by this court in
Shirt.26
Hence, defendants ought not to be required to take into account ‘remote
possibilities of harm’.27 Having taken this restrictive view, McHugh J linked
it to the maintenance of the normal fortitude test in nervous shock cases:
Once it is accepted that a risk is not necessarily reasonably foreseeable because it is
not far-fetched or fanciful, criticism of the ‘normal fortitude’ test wears a different
21 See also I Freckelton, ‘Damages for Psychiatric Injury: Setting the Limits’ (2000) 7
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 184 at 290, stating that the case had ‘little merit’.
22 (2002) 191 ALR 449 at [90], [109] per McHugh J, [273] per Hayne J, [331] per Callinan J.
23 Ibid, at [273].
24 (1980) CLR 40; 29 ALR 217.
25 (2002) 191 ALR 449 at [96].
26 Ibid, at [104].
27 Ibid, at [108].
14 (2003) 11 Torts Law Journal
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complexion. Once the notion of reasonableness regains its rightful place at the front
of the negligence inquiry, it must follow that a defendant is entitled to act on the
basis that there will be a normal reaction to his or her conduct. The position is
different if the defendant knows that the plaintiff is in a special position. But
otherwise the defendant should not be penalised for abnormal reactions to his or her
conduct.
To insist that the duty of reasonable care in pure psychiatric illness cases be
anchored by reference to the most vulnerable person in the community — by
reference to the most fragile psyche in the community — would place an undue
burden on social action and communication.28
Two other members of the court, however, considered that foreseeability of
psychiatric injury to a person of normal fortitude was not a requirement or
precondition of liability, but opinions differed as to the exact role of ‘normal
fortitude’. Gummow and Kirby JJ, in their joint judgment, strongly rejected
any role for such a restriction. They considered that the question is one of
reasonable foreseeability of the relevant risk.29 Although this imported an
objective standard, they stressed that:
the concept of ‘normal fortitude’ should not distract attention from the central
inquiry, which is whether, in all the circumstances, the risk of the plaintiff sustaining
a recognisable psychiatric illness was reasonably foreseeable, in the sense that the
risk was not far-fetched or fanciful. It may be that, in some circumstances, the risk
of a recognisable psychiatric illness to a person who falls outside the notion of
‘normal fortitude’ is nonetheless not far-fetched or fanciful.30
None the less, Gummow and Kirby JJ recognised some role for ‘normal
fortitude’ in the context of the objective criterion of reasonable foreseeability.
References to the ‘notional person of “normal fortitude” is the application of
a hypothetical standard that assists the assessment of the reasonable
foreseeability of harm, not an independent pre-condition or bar to recovery’.31
Somewhere between these two approaches are the views of Gleeson CJ and
Gaudron J. Gleeson CJ stated that courts:
refer to ‘a normal standard of susceptibility’ as one of a number of ‘general
guidelines’ in judging reasonable foreseeability . . . [and that] idea is valid and
remains relevant, even though ‘normal fortitude’ cannot be regarded as a separate
and definitive test of liability.32
Similarly, Gaudron J, though denying that normal fortitude is the ‘sole
criterion’ determinative of foreseeability,33 none the less saw it as relevant and
important as ordinarily a convenient means of determining whether a risk is
foreseeable.34
Hence, all members of the court to varying degrees accept a role for
28 Ibid, at [108]–[109].
29 Ibid, at [200].
30 Ibid, at [201] (footnote omitted).
31 Ibid, at [197] (emphasis added). See also at [200].
32 Ibid, at [16]. See also at [29], in rejecting Mrs Tame’s nervous shock as not reasonably
foreseeable, Gleeson CJ states: ‘This conclusion does not depend upon the application, as an
inflexible test of liability, of a standard of normal fortitude;’ but Mrs Tame’s susceptibility
was a factor to be taken into account.
33 Ibid, at [60], [61].
34 Ibid, at [62].
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‘normal fortitude’, but it is not clear whether the differently expressed
opinions as to the nature of that role are merely a matter of semantics and
emphasis or whether they lead to significant differences in application and
outcomes. Further, since two, and possibly four, members of the court reject
‘normal fortitude’ as an express and separate element of the reasonable
foreseeability test, it is surprising that the recent Review of the Law of
Negligence Final Report concludes that the High Court has adopted the
foreseeability of harm to a person of ‘normal fortitude’ as the operative test in
Australian law.35
‘Sudden shock’
In relation to the issue of ‘sudden shock’, Callinan J considered that it is a
continuing requirement of the law. Perhaps surprisingly, given the
interpretations by others of the events in Annetts as involving ‘agonisingly
protracted’ suffering,36 Callinan J considered the requirement to have been
satisfied in that case.37 McHugh J left open the question of whether ‘sudden
shock’ was an additional requirement of liability, the issue not needing to be
decided. This was because Mrs Tame’s claim failed at the threshold test of
‘reasonable foreseeability’ of nervous shock to a person of normal fortitude.
In relation to the Annetts’ claims, McHugh J decided that a duty existed on the
basis of the parties’ pre-existing relationships, namely that created by the
employment of James by the defendants and the assurances given by them to
the Annetts about taking care of him.38
Although the other five members of the court agreed that ‘sudden shock’
was not a separate legal requirement, again there appeared to be considerable
differences of opinion amongst the majority as to the role it should play.
Gummow and Kirby JJ considered that situations involving ‘protracted
suffering’ may raise difficult issues of causation and remoteness, and should be
dealt with at that stage of a negligence inquiry.39 Gleeson CJ considered the
existence of a ‘sudden shock’ as a relevant factual indicator of a ‘proximity’
of relationship between defendant and plaintiff.40 Gaudron J considered that
psychiatric injury will often not be foreseeable without a ‘sudden shock’, but
that it was not a critical requirement of the existence of a duty.41 Finally,
Hayne J considered that a ‘sudden shock’ is ‘not ordinarily’ to be regarded as
an additional element above and beyond the ordinary fortitude test,42 but finds
reflection in the determination of the response of a person of ordinary
fortitude.
Again, it is not clear whether these are merely semantic differences, or
whether they will have a significant impact upon the application of the law. It
35 See [9.13]. The Report was the result of a government sponsored review of negligence law
and was authored by a panel chaired by Justice Ipp. It is available at
<http//revofneg.treasury.gov.au>.
36 (2002) 191 ALR 449 at [36] per Gleeson CJ; see also at [210] per Gummow and Kirby JJ.
37 Ibid, at [364].
38 Ibid, at [139].
39 Ibid, at [210].
40 Ibid, at [35]. See also at [18].
41 Ibid, at [66].
42 Ibid, at [275].
16 (2003) 11 Torts Law Journal
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is clear, however, that these represent very different conceptual approaches as
to the appropriate stage of inquiry in which ‘sudden shock’ is factored: as part
of the foreseeability test, or as establishing ‘proximity’, or as part of the
causation inquiry.
‘Direct perception’
In relation to the issue of whether there needs to be a ‘direct perception’ by a
plaintiff suffering psychiatric injury of the distressing event or its ‘immediate
aftermath’ in order to give rise to liability, a similar division to that evident in
the analysis of ‘sudden shock’ arose amongst the members of the court.
Callinan J saw it as a continuing element of liability, but considered it satisfied
in Annetts.43 McHugh J left the issue open. Gummow and Kirby JJ saw it as
a factor relevant in assessing reasonable foreseeability, causation and
remoteness. Gleeson CJ did not consider it an essential requirement but an
indicator of ‘proximity’. Gaudron J agreed with Gummow and Kirby JJ that
insisting upon a requirement of ‘direct perception’ would produce anomalous
results, but that in its absence, plaintiffs would still need to identify additional
special features of their relationships with the defendants, so that the latter
should have the former in contemplation as directly affected by their acts.44
Finally, Hayne J perceived ‘direct perception’ as having the same role as
‘sudden shock’.
Comment
The application of these principles to the facts of the two cases was a fairly
straightforward matter, leading to opposite conclusions being reached in
relation to each. In Tame, even those judges who denied the requirement of
‘normal fortitude’ as a prerequisite to liability considered that Mrs Tame’s
claim could not succeed. Her nervous shock was not a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of a ‘clerical error which she was told was a mistake that had
been rectified and in respect of which she had received a formal apology’.45
In the view of Gummow and Kirby JJ, Mrs Tame’s reaction was ‘extreme and
idiosyncratic’ and the risk of such a reaction ‘was far-fetched or fanciful’.46
Importantly, the joint judgment reiterated that the reasonable foresight test is
that of the reasonable person in the defendant’s position, and not that of
experts. Hence, expert evidence by psychiatrists that such a reaction by a
person in a delusional state of mind was foreseeable was not decisive.47 Not
surprisingly, Mrs Tame’s claim was also rejected by the rest of the court, most
obviously, on the approach of McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ, because her
response did not coincide with that of a person of ordinary fortitude and hence
was not foreseeable.
Unrelated to the issues addressed above, some members of the court
stressed two further reasons for denying a duty of care. First, any duty owed
43 Ibid, at [365], but note the curious definition of ‘direct perception’ adopted by Callinan J,
discussed below.
44 Ibid, at [52].
45 Ibid, at [233] per Gummow and Kirby JJ.
46 Ibid, at [233]. See also Gleeson CJ at [29].
47 Ibid, at [234].
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in the circumstances by the police officers to Mrs Tame would conflict with
their primary responsibility to investigate the matter in question.48 Secondly,
since Mrs Tame’s claim was that incorrect information had been provided
about her, her concern was with her reputation. Hence, the law of defamation
is the more appropriate mechanism for reconciling the competing interests of
the parties.49
In Annetts, the result was also unanimous, this time in the appellants’
favour. Having rejected the requirement of ‘sudden shock’ and ‘direct
perception’ as prerequisites to a claim, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and
Kirby, and Hayne JJ stressed the reasonable foreseeability of the response of
the Annetts to the events which had occurred. Indeed, Annetts is a perfect
illustration of the dangers of using control mechanisms such as ‘sudden shock’
and ‘direct perception’ as universally applicable prerequisites of legal liability.
The tragic facts of the case bear this out: the long, drawn out search for and
ultimate recovery of James’ body were not directly perceived by his parents.
None the less, psychiatric illness as a consequence seemed not only
reasonably foreseeable, but perhaps even likely.
McHugh J also considered that the shock suffered by the appellants was
foreseeable, and went on to add that the pre-existing relationship between the
appellants and respondent established a duty of care. Perhaps the most
problematic reasoning was that of Callinan J. He concluded that both ‘sudden
shock’ and a ‘direct perception’ of the accident or immediate aftermath were
necessary. Surprisingly, however, his Honour considered that both these
requirements were satisfied on the facts of Annetts. In relation to ‘direct
perception’, this followed from Callinan J’s rather idiosyncratic definition of
that notion. He said:
I would regard a requirement of direct perception as being no more than a
requirement that, by one or other of the senses, a ‘bilaterally related person’
perceive, or come to know of, or realise, at the time of, or as soon as is practicable
after its occurrence, a shocking event or its shocking aftermath. So long as, in the
case of non-contemporaneity, the lapse of time would not have caused a person of
normal fortitude to have reached a settled state of mind about the event, the temporal
connection will be capable of existing.50
With all due respect, this is difficult to follow. ‘Direct perception’ extended
merely to hearing about an event seems a meaningless concept. Further, the
additional point about ‘non-contemporaneity’ is not easy to understand. If
persons have not yet been told about an event, how can they ever have reached
a ‘settled state of mind’ about the matter? The requirement that any
communication must have occurred as soon as ‘reasonably practicable’ after
the event51 is also odd. What has this got to do with the plaintiffs? If there is
an unreasonable delay in the communication, why should this be relevant to
its impact upon the relatives? Being told ‘today your son was killed in a
48 See, eg, ibid, at [26] per Gleeson CJ, [122]–[126] per McHugh J, [298] per Hayne J, [336]
per Callinan J.
49 Ibid, at [123] per McHugh J. This is the same point as was made in Sullivan v Moody (2001)
207 CLR 562; 183 ALR 404.
50 Tame and Annetts at [365].
51 Ibid, at [366].
18 (2003) 11 Torts Law Journal
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horrific accident’ seems no different to being told ‘last week your son was
killed in a horrific accident’. All in all, Callinan J’s judgment raises far more
questions than it answers.
Conclusion
So where does this leave the law of nervous shock? Certainly, the rejection by
five of the seven members of the court of ‘sudden shock’ and ‘direct
perception’ as prerequisites of liability is welcome. Knowing that the absence
of these two elements does not preclude liability, however, does not clarify
how the new boundaries of nervous shock law will be drawn. Gummow and
Kirby JJ’s joint judgment exhibits the most liberal approach. In essence, they
treat nervous shock cases as just another species of negligence, to be analysed
in the same way. The more cautious tenor of Gleeson CJ’s and Gaudron J’s
judgments is not necessarily in complete support of such a step; but nor do
these judgments give support to the more restrictive approaches (albeit in very
different ways) of McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ.52
It should be noted that reforms have been suggested in the Review of the
Law of Negligence Final Report, prepared by the Panel chaired by Justice Ipp
as a consequence of the insurance and torts ‘crisis’. If adopted,53 the
recommendations may clarify some of the uncertainties remaining after Tame
and Annetts, particularly in relation to the appropriate conceptual framework.
In short, the Report proposes that, where a plaintiff suffers a recognised
psychiatric illness, a defendant will owe such a plaintiff a duty of care if ‘the
defendant ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might, in
the circumstances, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care
was not taken’. In determining this question, factors such as ‘sudden shock’,
witnessing the events or their aftermath, personally or otherwise, and the
relationship of the plaintiff to the victim of the accident and the defendant, are
all relevant considerations in assessing reasonable foreseeability. Whatever
the merits of the Report’s recommendations as a whole, this is perhaps a
reasonable compromise which may well encapsulate the essence of most of
the judgments in Tame and Annetts. In particular, it may provide a clear
conceptual framework as a starting point for analysis, something which the
High Court judgments, unfortunately, failed to do.
52 Whereas McHugh J might well support the treatment of nervous shock cases in the same
terms as negligence (he leaves the status of ‘sudden shock’ and ‘direct perception’ open), he
takes a much more restrictive approach to reasonable foreseeability generally. Hayne J
appears the most insistent on the need for ‘normal fortitude’; and Callinan J insists on both
‘sudden shock’ and ‘direct perception’ as prerequisites of liability.
53 See also the more restrictive principles contained in the Civil Liability Amendment
(Personal Responsibility) Act 2002 (NSW) (assented to 28 November 2002). To my
knowledge, none of the other States’ legislative responses to the torts and insurance ‘crisis’
passed in 2002 contain provisions setting out the requirements for a nervous shock claim.
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